The 
Introduction
Industrial-scale microgrids offer increased resilience, reduced risk, and enhanced controls for critical plant loads and operations, as well as the local electric grid. This paper will demonstrate methods for calculating risk, designing a microgrid, and normal operation cost recovery.
Electrical outages affect millions of customers in the U.S. every year. Increasing the resilience to natural and man-made events of the electric grid can have farreaching societal benefits. Some of the largest individual consumers of electricity are industrial facilities. Industrial customers require highly reliable power to properly do business, and an electrical outage at the wrong moment can cause losses in the millions of dollars per hour.
Many facilities have backup generation, which is both simple and proven. However, as the electric grid modernizes, the use of microgrids as a backup system can provide benefits to both the facility and the electric grid. Benefits to an industrial customer with an installed microgrid include: 1) reduced risk from natural and man-made grid outages; 2) enhanced resilience to abnormal grid conditions; and 3) integration and optimization of energy generation sources for more efficient and economical operation.
Reduction in Risk
Every facility has risk from loss of energy supply. These risks are numerous, and it is up to the business manager to make "informed choices" on where and when to spend finite resources to protect the entire facility with regards to mitigating the risk of outages and thus addressing energy assurance.
Microgrid designs are also numerous, and can range from small, cheap installations that mitigate some risk to very large, expensive installations which significantly reduce facility risk. Using a value-based metric, this paper quantifies the risk of an enterprise system for each stakeholder based on the amount of loss that results from security threats and vulnerabilities.
Enhanced Resiliency
In the event of energy supply loss, a sufficiently sized microgrid can continue to operate the facility, independent of the state of the electric grid supply chain. Large facilities require advanced controls and coordination of assets to operate in an islanded mode, but the facility gains resiliency and reduces downtime.
Many facilities have some form of backup generation for critical loads, like emergency lighting. Microgrids can be designed to run the entire facility without grid power for days, hours, or just long enough to gracefully shut down the equipment to avoid damage and loss of inventory. This paper investigates microgrid designs which cover both ends of the continuum and quantify their impacts.
Integration and Optimization
A microgrid installation typically involves the collection and communication of multiple measurements and device parameters to a controller, which coordinates the generation and loads. A microgrid can allow for more active control over a facility, by interacting with the process control system to reduce inactive processes based on available generation for peak load reduction. Microgrid installations can now achieve this goal while addressing operational goals that include reliability improvements, cost reduction and market participation [1] .
Microgrids also enable integration of many different types of fuel sources, diversifying the generation mix while reducing the probability of single points of failure. Solar arrays, natural gas turbines, diesel engines, and battery storage each have properties which can be beneficial to the reliability and resilience of a facility. A mix of generation resources can help to mask the resources' individual deficiencies, such as intermittency, long startup times, and inefficient operation. For example, a software optimizer can capture device behaviors to allow for automatic control of resources toward a common goal.
Utility Participation
Utilities base the rate they charge industrial customers via specific utility program parameters (e.g., cost/kWh during peak load periods). By participating in utility programs, industrial customers seek a positive return on their investment (ROI) during grid operations while simultaneously contributing a needed service to the grid. Instead of a rarely used backup, the generation can have a more active role in maintaining the stability and resilience of the local power system. During grid operations, an industrial microgrid allows for more active industrial customer participation in utility programs. During peak demands, utilities make requests of their industry partners such as demand reduction. A request for demand reduction can be achieved through either the industry partner shedding load or increasing generation. The microgrid gives flexibility to the industrial customer in how to best achieve the desired load reduction.
United Parcel Service (UPS) Study
As a partner in the study [2] , the UPS Worldport, Centennial Hub, and Supply Chain Solutions (SCS) campus in Louisville, KY demonstrated the validity of the approach described here.
The facility's risk mitigation strategy was determined using the All Hazards Econometrics System (AHES) method. AHES was used to evaluate the ROI for two microgrid improvement options. The first was a reduced operational sort (i.e., closing down certain sorting lanes) and the second solution considered additional resources to allow continued normal operations. AHES is an adaption of the Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) [3] . CSES's high-level workflow is illustrated in Figure 1 . For each of these (fairly) different facilities, multiple microgrid improvement options were modeled with the opensource Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Microgrid Design Toolkit [4] . Each microgrid solution ranged from a lower cost, with a small reliability improvement, to a more expensive cost, with a high reliability improvement. Combining these two methods and tools resulted in a newly developed approach for predicting and mitigating industrial "peak" loads. We estimated resiliency improvement, installed cost and cost avoidance for each proposed risk mitigation strategy along with a coincidental cost recovery benefit derived from normal microgrid operations.
Background
The DOE's Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (GMLC) Multi-Year Program Plan [2] states, "…security and resilience of the modern electric grid may be defined as the functional preservation of the electric grid operations in the face of natural and manmade threats and hazards." While the U.S. electric grid is highly reliable, severe weather events and cyber-attacks threaten to cause extensive damage to its aging infrastructure, resulting in extended periods of outage for customers. The economic impacts of weather-related outages in 2012 were estimated at between $27 and $52 billion [5] . Since 2000, the five-year average number of outages per year has doubled every five years, and the average number of monthly outages have increased six-fold [6] .
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) defines industrial electricity customers as the "facilities and equipment used for producing, processing, or assembling goods" [7] . Industrial electricity customers make up 0.56% of electricity customers [8] , but account for roughly 25% of all energy sales in the U.S. [9] . A single hour-long outage can cause the loss of hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars in output, lost inventory, brand degradation, and restart costs.
A microgrid, per DOE's terms [10] , is: ''a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island mode.'' Microgrid research is constantly evolving to include advanced controls and communication systems for a wide range of applications [11] [12] [13] [14] . Capabilities enabled by microgrid technologies include: 1) seamless transition; 2) renewables integration; 3) voltage support; 4) peak shaving, 5) economic dispatch; 6) energy shifting; and 7) black start.
Case Study Environment
First-generation microgrids have focused primarily on priority critical loads, such as hospitals, military bases, and college campuses [15] [16] [17] . These types of facilities play vital roles to the country and are dependent on highly reliable power.
Similarly, many industrial facilities are critical to the daily operations of people and businesses across the country. The UPS Worldport facility is the largest automated package handling facility in the world [18] [19], processing approximately 416,000 packages per hour. As an air hub with more than 300 flights arriving and departing daily, Worldport has very strict requirements on flight schedules. Even a small electrical outage which stops the sorting equipment for a few minutes causes far-reaching ripples to those people and businesses depending on their service. Delays on timecritical packages such as refrigerated vaccines and living tissues could be disastrous to those depending on the materials.
UPS is a global leader in logistics, offering a broad range of solutions including transporting packages and freight; facilitating international trade, and deploying advanced technology to more efficiently manage the world of business. Headquartered in Atlanta, UPS serves more than 220 countries and territories worldwide. The facilities of interest include: Worldport, Centennial Hub, and SCS campus (though SCS data is not included in this analysis).
Process and Results
To understand how a microgrid bolsters resilience for a facility, it is critical to quantify the risks the facility faces daily and design to mitigate specific scenarios.
The All Hazards Econometrics System (AHES) is a Cybernomics computational method for determining Mean Failure Cost (MFC) [20] [21] [22] , modified herein from Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) [3] [23] [24] used previously in industrial settings [25] ; applied to industry standards [26] [27]; and applied to cloud environments [27] [28] . The cost/benefits risk assessment of the project [2] was carried out by computing the Mean Failure Cost (MFC) for various UPS stakeholders addressing grid vulnerability, consequence, and risk analysis. The reduction in MFC can then be matched against the costs and risks of deploying them, using relevant ROI functions.
Tools Used to Determine Mean Failure Cost
The value-based metric (MFC), when applied, quantifies the risks to an enterprise system on an individual stakeholder basis. MFC represents the loss that potentially results from threats and system vulnerabilities. MFC depends on the inherent system infrastructure (e.g., weaknesses) and accounts for the stakeholders' variances in terms of their individual mission requirements, that are satisfied via that infrastructure has in meeting each enterprise requirement.
Steps for Determining Mean Failure Cost
The essential steps involve I/O components and phases (i.e., discovery, classification and evaluation, metrics and mitigation as shown in Figure 1 ). The data collection/analysis consist of systems stakeholders, system specifications and requirements. System components makeup the requirements and the associated natural threats that exist. These natural Page 3534 threats have the potential of causing a negative impact on the normal operations of the overall system. In this study, we address only rigorously documented natural hazards (i.e., threats) which cannot be altered (i.e., are immutable). The steps in determining MFC, when applied, result in the AHES method which was essentially derived as part of this case study.
To estimate the MFC for the set of stakeholders of a system, we identify and then maintain the following information: (1) the set of stakeholders; (2) the set of functional specifications/requirements; (3) for each stakeholder row and each requirement column, the stake that the stakeholder attaches to the selected service (or conversely, the cost that the stakeholder incurs if the service is disrupted (i.e., Stakes Matrix (ST)); and (4) for each component column of a specific requirement row (i.e., Dependency Matrix (DP)), the likelihood that the system provides that specific service requirement. The likelihood of a materialized threat column entries impacting the component row entries (i.e., Impact Matrix (IM)) is dependent on the probability of the emergence of a threat (i.e., Probability Threat vector (PT)) and the likelihood that such a threat would affect that component. The AHES method involves the generation of ST, DP, IM, as well as the PT. We derive the vector of mean failure costs (one entry per stakeholder) by Eq. (1) as a baseline:
IM Generation Using Mitigation Cost Estimates
Several studies in the past have used CSES to assess changes (i.e., Δ) resulting from mitigations (e.g., investments aimed at improving/hardening the infrastructures). The MFC formula [29] maps a threat configuration (PT) onto a vector of mean failure costs (MFC). When a security measure is deployed, its impact can be measured by considering how it affects the threat configuration (say, PT' instead of PT) and thereby how it affects (hopefully reduces) the MFC vector (MFC' instead of MFC). In [30] , the ΔMFC was used as a measure of the effectiveness of security measures in hardening the infrastructure. This measure supported the following decisions.
First, stakeholders can determine whether a measure is worthwhile by matching its deployment cost against its benefit, represented in terms of the reduced MFC (and represented in monetary terms). The decision can, in fact, be modeled as a return on investment (ROI).
Second, analysts can also use the MFC reduction for each stakeholder as a basis for distributing the cost of the measure on the various system stakeholders. In [30] , we discussed alternative ways to do this.
Third, managers can use the cost sharing formula to assess how much the measure costs them and use the MFC reductions to quantify their respective gains from the measure. Using this information, an ROI is computed. An ROI enables us to determine whether the measure benefits them individually. Previously documented approaches illustrated this premise [31] .
For the sake of illustration, previously documented, consider the threat vector has been reduced to the new value: PT՛. The gain in mean failure cost can then be estimated using the equation:
where ΔPT = PT՛ -PT. This results in the gain in MFC in monetary units/time frame and shows the added value gained by stakeholders.
The following example illustrates how to judge the cost effectiveness of a given enhancement. For a given security enhancement measure, the service provider can determine the cost effectiveness by comparing the cost of installing the enhancement versus the gains in subscriber fees collected because of enhanced security (minus any subscriber loss that may result). This can be modeled as a ROI decision, as discussed in [30] and adapted from [22] [23].
Since we are only concerned about naturally occurring hazards (i.e., threats), which cannot necessarily be altered, we introduce a new concept for AHES that can be regulated. Natural hazards are normally assumed to occur based on historical evidence [32] . The effect of a materializing threat can however, be mitigated by improving/hardening the cyber/physical infrastructure. Moreover, the damage anticipated can be reduced if the enterprise environment is altered (i.e., harden the system) based on the risk informed assessment information. Thus, we introduce a new interpretation which results in a change from the baseline probability represented in IM from the baseline that Component Ck fails once threat Tq has materialized giving us IM՛ or ΔIM.
The beneficial gain in mean failure cost (as expressed monetarily by the reduction in failure cost) can now be estimated as:
where ΔIM = IM՛ -IM. This results in a positive gain overall for the MFC in monetary units/time frame (in our case $/day). This moreover, shows the added value (ROI) gained by stakeholders from an enhanced architecture. Equally, in our case, the analysis helps us understand the savings produced from hardening the Page 3535 enterprise against natural threats and assists decision makers in commercial ROI decisions. The resulting AHES method (calculation of MFC) helps decision makers by putting a monetary value on the service that is delivered to stakeholders.
In general, the stakeholders collectively perform the organizational mission requirements and therefore the overall benefactor is the organization or "enterprise" as discussed above.
Estimating ΔMFC -A Case in Point
In [32] , Louisville Metro prepared its Hazard Mitigation Plan pursuant to the Section 322 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5165, as amended by Section 104 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-390 (DMA 2000) and regulations set forth in 44 CFR §201 [33] . The Plan identifies potential hazards, assesses risk, and presents mitigation strategies to build community resilience. The expected loss is reduced if we alter the enterprise environment (i.e., harden the system).
The beneficial gain in mean failure cost (as expressed monetarily by the reduction in failure cost) is thus estimated as shown in Eq. 3. In the analysis of the UPS Worldport and Centennial facilities at Louisville, Kentucky, we considered the unique stakeholders for the enterprise as the following: 1) UPS Facilities at Louisville -UPS Enterprise Stakeholders collectively; 2) UPS Facility -Worldport Stakeholders; and 3) UPS Facility -Centennial Hub Stakeholders. The individual contribution of the respective stakeholders is documented in Table 1 .
The collective UPS Enterprise Stakeholders at the Louisville complex versus their respective requirements can be depicted as the Stakes Matrix (ST) Table 2 . The logic for the ST depends on the following premises: (1) a stakeholder may have different stakes in different requirements; and (2) a functional requirement may carry different stakes for different stakeholders. The best way to represent this situation is through a two-dimensional matrix, where the rows represent stakeholders, the columns represent operational requirements and the entries represent stakes, as shown in Table 2 .
The failure cost in each column's cell in Table 2 is the monetary amount for the respective stakeholder (the row entry) when the system fails to meet each stakeholder's functional requirement. We therefore quantify theses variables in terms of financial loss per unit of operation time (e.g., $/day); it represents the mean loss that the stakeholder may experience in case of a failure. Table 1 represents the potential monetary loss by a stakeholder. The analysis team worked closely with UPS participants to determine the best and most accurate data to populate the AHES matrices. Data was analyzed from the UPS, Inc. second quarter earnings report ending June 30, 2017, and was used to calculate the Worldport and Centennial Hub stakeholder's monetary loss [34] . The following logic was used to determine the Worldport and Centennial Hub, stakeholder's mean financial loss:
Worldport -From the 2017 second quarter earnings report [34] , the per package revenue is calculated as a weighted combination of two revenues: the next day delivery cost and the international package cost. The revenue per package is comprised from 80% of the next day delivery sort revenue ($19.62 per package) plus [34] and from [35] . 20% from the total international package revenue ($16.31 per package).
Centennial Hub "Current" -The Centennial Hub building first opened in May of 2008, with a sorting capacity of 40,000 packages per hour. That translates in 640,000 packages per day (two eight-hour shifts). From the 2017 second quarter earnings report [34] , the per package revenue for U.S. Domestic package ground ($8.37) is herein used for calculating the specific daily revenue per Day Failure Cost.
Centennial Hub "Expansion" -The expansion of enhanced technology in the Centennial Hub facility will increase capacity to 85,000 packages per hour, improving both reliability and quality of service provided to UPS customers [35] . The UPS Centennial Hub will triple the size of the current package sorting facility to 838,000 square feet, and nearly double its current sorting capacity to 85,000 packages per hour [36] which results in 1,3600,00 packages per day (two eight-hour shifts). From the 2017 second quarter earnings report [34] , the per package revenue for U.S. 
Figure 2: AHES' Risk Mitigation Flowchart
Page 3537 Domestic package ground ($8.37) is herein used for calculating the specific daily revenue per Day Failure Cost. Natural hazards were evaluated. We considered the dependency of the stakeholders' requirement of availability as key to fulfilling the respective stakeholders' individual and collective requirements with regards to their missions.
The respective components to the stakeholder's requirements of availability included: 1) Electricity Distribution; 2) Electric Grid Infrastructure; 3) Installation Unique Sorting Equipment; 4) Computers; 5) Lighting; 6) Air Conditioning Equipment; 7) Airplanes Functioning & on time Truck Support Vehicles Functioning; and 8) No Component Failure (NCF). The probability of the system failing, with respect to a given requirement and given that a component has failed, is shown in Table 3 .
UPS, Inc. stated in an annual report on Form 10-K [37] , filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the following.: "Severe weather or other natural or manmade disasters could adversely affect our business."
Components of the UPS enterprise architecture of the facilities at the Louisville complex may fail to operate properly because of functional breakdowns This data may be usurped by recent data concerning Hurricane Harvey and its cumulative effects in 2017. The above threats are cataloged in Table 4 and their respective impacts are populated in Table 4 .
The "Loss Matrix" table in [32] provided quantitative data that portrays which hazards have the potential to cause the most devastation, based on frequencies and damage numbers, where available. The data was used by the project team to help prioritize which hazards should receive the most consideration when justifying potential mitigation projects in current specific efforts regarding the placement and the configuration of the microgrid and its analysis. It was the intent of this effort that other commercial entities, including UPS, will use this technique in the future. The loss and occurrence data (based on the number of events divided by the total number of damages) was used to populate the threat probability vector (Table 5) , which is used in calculating MFC. As mentioned [32] , this data can be improved and Louisville Metro is dedicated to keeping better loss information to improve the results of this model.
Given the populated stakes matrix ST, the dependency matrix DP, the impact matrix IM and the threat vector PT, we now can derive the MFC by Eq. 1. The resultant MFC for the UPS enterprise at the Louisville facility is represented as the MFC per stakeholder in Table 6 .
During the course of this study, a reduced sort (50%) solution addressed a way to allow the advantages of the microgrid to be evaluated in the context of risk assessment [45] . The cumulative amount of power by implementing the microgrid solution is also approximately 50% of the needed power to run the facility. Secondly, the SNL MDT model quantified the energy availability (99%) by adding generator capacity to UPS's microgrid. From this data, we reduced from the baseline: the component "Electric Grid Infrastructure" row in the IM (Table 4 ) by 50%; and the rows, "Electric Distribution", and "Electric Grid Infrastructure" (Table 4) by 99%. Table 6 identifies the baseline MFC for the specified stakeholders and the per cent reduction in MFC by hardening the environment by percentage amounts of 50% reduced sort and 99%. energy availability.
Conclusions
The reduction in MFC (as expressed in USD/day) was derived by applying Eq. 2. This shows the added value gained by each stakeholder due to a more resilient COOP architecture (i.e., hardening the enterprise against natural hazardous threats). The analysis provided a basis for prepositioning backup generation capacity, and enhancements that promise cost savings and ROI. In this way the AHES method helps decision makers better understand the value of the service and that is delivered to stakeholders enabling mission requirements. These numbers are directly comparable and give a bottom line understanding of the potential impact, root cause (i.e., source) that includes the kill chain from threat to asset and the affect to operations and in all stakeholders.
The beneficial impact to the collective UPS Facilities is shown in Table 6 . This is achieved by implementing the various components of the microgrid solutions. The MFC reduction ranges from 14-15% for the 50% Reduced Sort and from 56-59% for the 99% Energy Availability. Based on AHES's MFC, the best microgrid implementation that UPS should consider for their particular facilities' implementation, has been reduced to a business decision. The AHES method provides the logic to "grade" the level of ROI (a graded approach) desired for this business decision. This paper considers the industrial viewpoint and uses real world data for COOP planning.
This work was supported by a grant from DOE. We derived the AHES methodology from CSES (as the basis) to track many facets of the cause/loss-impact to operations. In this way, COOP planners determined the primary operational weaknesses and could prioritize course of action based on the cost of mitigation (i.e., hardening solutions) and the prospect of ROI. The artifacts of this investigation will be useful on an ongoing basis for assessment and risk abatement.
